Hegel's paradox revisited

Six years ago I summarized in this blog some thoughts on what I called Hegel's paradox.
I was puzzled by an argument (actually an anti-thesis) Hegel calls "verkehrte Welt" in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 
This anti-thesis occurs after Hegel discussed the "Realm of Laws [of nature]" (the thesis to be attacked, see my old post) and it captures a beautiful ambiguity of two meanings, "wrong world" and "inverted world":

1. wrong in the sense that the view outlined in in the section on "Realm of Laws" is unsustainable, and
2. inverted in the sense that the view is upside down and needs to be put on its feet again.

This is dialectics at its finest.

In short, what still bothers me is the distinction between laws of nature on the one side, and particular entities (such as particles, or sensations) on the other side. Hegel attempts to overcome this dualism, but his movement of thought leads almost directly to consciousness as its synthesis and shortly after to self-consciousness, which leaves me with many questions. I believe that there is a paradox which needs to be resolved.
I agree with Hegel (if I understand him correctly) that the distinction between laws and particulars is somehow wrong, but I am not sure what conclusion to draw from this.

My first idea, about six years ago, was that both aspects can be captured in the notion of information.
But this is a vague notion and I made no progress in understanding what information is "behind the scenes."
Now I became interested in what can be called the Philosophy of Computation.  There is not much literature on this subject, but it might be a promising enterprise, and it might shed light on the paradox as well.

We are familiar with the analogy of the mind as a computer, and that of the universe as computer (see e.g. Konrad Zuse, Rechnender Raum). I like these analogies, but we should not think necessarily of digital (serial) computers similar to that I type this blog entry on. Also the brain does computations in some sense, although a neural network is very different from processors.

At some fundamental level, consciousness could be an emergent phenomenon of computation (rather than of specific natural laws). Computation produces information. Also, computation does not presuppose a person who designed a program or who is interested in the result. Some kind of computation might simply emerge in complex systems without any pre-defined aim. Think of the occurance of the Fibbonacci series and the Golden ratio in biological systems as an example.

The precise equations of the fundamental laws might even become irrelevant, as long as they admit a framework for computation. But then the question what is more fundamental - the laws or the computing process - is pointless.

Computation, I believe, is a more general concept than natural laws, but is still more restrictive than mathematics as a whole. This is promising.